William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
Volume 1 (1949-1953)
Issue 3

Article 7

May 1951

Property - Enforcement of Personal Covenants Against
Subsequent Grantees
Thomas G. Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Repository Citation
Thomas G. Martin, Property - Enforcement of Personal Covenants Against Subsequent
Grantees, 1 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 92 (1951), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol1/
iss3/7
Copyright c 1951 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval

PROPERTY

-

ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL

COVENANTS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT GRANTEES
Plaintiff sold two lots of land, and to protect his grocery business
which he operated on a lot near-by, he included in the deed the
following covenant:
"The above conveyance is made upon the condition that
said parties of the second part, nor their assigns, shall sell
in any building to be erected upon said lots, any groceries
or bottled drinks except that bottled High Rock may be
sold on said premises, on any day after six o'clock P. M."
The deed was properly recorded. The purchaser from plaintiff
later sold the lots to defendant, and although the second deed did
not mention the covenant, defendant had actual knowledge thereof.
Defendant leased one lot to lessee who opened a grocery store
thereon. It was not shown that lessee knew of the covenant. The
trial court refused to enjoin the operation of lessee's store, construing the covenant to be a personal one not running with the land
which bound only the original parties to it. On appeal, held,
reversed. Even though the covenant is personal and does not run
with the land, it will be enforced in equity against a subsequent
grantee of the land who takes with notice, either actual or constructive, of its existence. Oliver v. Hewitt et al., 191 Va. 163, 60 S. E.
2d 1 (1950).
A personal covenant has been defined as one "which binds only
the covenantor and his personal representatives in respect to assets,
and can be taken advantage of only by the covenantee."' While
this definition is basically correct, it is apparent that it falls far short
of being complete. To round out the definition of a personal covenant it is helpful to show how it differs generally from a covenant
that runs with the land. In the case of the latter it is necessary that
the agreement touch and concern the land, and that there be privity
of estate between the owners of the land to which the covenant is
appurtenant.2 Grantees, 3 heirs, and devisees 4 of either covenantor
or covenantee may suffer the burdens or enjoy the benefits of this
type of covenant regardless of whether or not such parties had
actual notice of the restriction.5 Personal covenants relate to some
collateral matter not necessarily concerning the land itself, and are
enforceable between the original parties' both at law and in equity.
Grantees, heirs and devisees of the covenantee may enjoy none of
the benefits of a personal covenant for the reason that the personal
obligation is extinguished when said covenantee's interest in the
land is terminated While it is well settled that personal covenants

can be enforced only by the covenantee, the question as to against
whom this enforcement can be had is still the source of considerable
disagreement. It is somewhat surprising to learn, however, that the
principal disagreement among the leading authorities 8 is not as to
whether there can be enforcement of personal covenants against
subsequent grantees with notice, but rather as to upon what theory
such enforcement is to be allowed.
An examination of the various theories of enforcement which
have been advanced suggests that the strength of each theory is
dependent upon the particular facts of each individual case. In the
renowned English case of Tulk v. Moxhay 9 it was reasoned that
the covenant must be enforced upon principles of unjust enrichment.
If the parties to this subsequent transaction considered the restriction binding upon them and fixed the price accordingly, then the
transferee would be unjustly enriched if the covenant were not
enforced against him. On the other hand if the parties thought the
covenant not to be binding upon transferees and determined the
price accordingly, the covenantee would be unjustly enriched if the
restriction were enforced. It has been asserted that this was more
logically a case of ordinary estoppel predicated upon notice of the
existence of the covenant.10 At any rate the courts have now practically discarded the theory of unjust enrichment in equitable
servitude cases."
The application of the doctrine of constructive trusts is a more
technical approach to. the problem." If there is a contract concerning the use of land which can be specifically enforced in equity,
and the parties intend that it shall run with the land, then a constructive trust is created. Since the equitable obligation refers to
the acts of the owner of the land, enforcement, if any, must be
against the present owner of the land. Therefore the equitable
obligation of the promisor is not personal but rather attached to
the land in the manner of a constructive trust, and continues to be
so attached until the land finds its way into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser. Under this theory it would follow that where the covenant has been included in a deed properly recorded there could be
no bona fide purchaser as to that covenant, and the constructive
trust would continue until the interest of the covenantee was terminated. The theory, while adequate to explain the legal effect of such
covenants, ignores in its terminology the fact that there is not really
a trust situation because there is no fidiciary element.
The state of California seems to stand alone in requiring that the
covenantee have privity of contract' 3 with the person against whom
enforcement is sought. Constructive notice only of a restrictive
covenant would be inadequate to fulfill the requirements. of a meet-

ing of the minds between the two parties to the controversy.
Strangely enough the California court relies on Tulk v. Moxhay,
supra, as the authority for this reasoning, thus affording a wide
variation to what is generally considered to be the doctrine of that
famous case.
In personal covenant cases one is also confronted with two opposing legal principles; first, the law favors freedom of contract, and
second, the law disfavors any restraint upon the use of land. The
test applied by the courts of this state in reconciling this conflict
is to consider whether the covenant merely affords fair protection
to the interests of the covenantee, or whether the agreement is
detrimental to public interest. 14
In the Oliver case the court does not specifically say upon what
theory the injunction will be allowed, but rather cites numerous
authorities, none of which are in complete accord on this point.
The most definite commitment made by the court as to theory of
enforcement is the following quotation from the leading case of
Whitney v. Union Railway Company:15 ".

.

. It (the personal

covenant) is not binding on him merely because he stands as an
assignee of the party who made the agreement, but because he has
taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement concerning it,

which he cannot equitably refuse to perform"."' Can one interpret
this to mean equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment, or is it a combination of both? The court seems perfectly content to let the matter
rest without further comment. While the lessee whose grocery
business has been enjoined may be chagrined to note that he is
victim of our system of recording land titles which was designed to
enable him to avoid just such situations as the one in which he now
finds himself, it is submitted that the decision of the court in the
Oliver case is sound, and further that its policy in not committing
itself upon any one or several of the various theories of enforcement
of personal covenants against subsequent grantees with notice is
likewise sound. The particular facts of each case must be weighed
in determining whether relief should be granted, and the courts of
equity should be unhampered within reasonable bounds in safeguarding against wrongs for which the law provides no remedy.
THOMAS G. MARTIN
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